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There is a rather remarkable and surprisingly uncontroversial result in economic theory
known as the Second Welfare Theorem: under certain idealized conditions, a competi-
tive free-market economy will achieve Pareto optimality. Pareto optimality is a widely-
accepted, weak condition for a well-functioning economy: there are no changes that can
improve one person’s welfare without harming at least one other person. All undisputable
welfare improvements have been made. However, the conditions required for competitive
markets to have this property are far from the conditions of real economies. The cen-
tral tasks of environmental economics are to identify market failures that prevent Pareto
optimality, and to design remedies for these failures.
Externalities are the most pervasive type of market failure. An externality is present
when the activity of one person has an inadvertent impact on the well-being of another
person. Environmental externalities are common because the use of many resources im-
poses costs on society, but the user of the resource is not charged a price equal to the cost
imposed. For example, the smoke emitted by a factory unintentionally worsens air quality
for nearby residents. The factory owner pays for the steel and oil used in production, but
not for the use of clean air.1
Externalities prevent the achievement of Pareto optimality because the polluter does
not equate his or her incremental benefit of generating a bit more pollution to the incre-
mental social cost of that pollution. To see this, suppose a factory can lower its production
cost by buying much dirtier but slightly cheaper coal. The benefit to the factory is a small
cost savings. The cost to society is the greater air pollution. If the factory owner keeps the
cost savings and doesn’t bear the cost of dirty air, even the smallest cost savings will be
pursued, no matter how dirty the coal. Suppose the cost savings is $1, but the social cost of
To appear in The Encyclopedia of the Environment , Houghton-Mifflin, 1993.
1 Henceforth polluting activities will be used to illustrate the points. Pollution is not the only type of
environmental externality, of course: global warming and the loss of wilderness are two other examples.
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the additional pollution (say, from additional lung disease) is $10. A Pareto improvement
is possible by stopping the use of the dirtier coal, while transferring $1 from the neighbors
to the factory owner. The factory owner still gains $1, while the neighbors pay only $1 to
gain $10 in clean air benefits.
When costly side effects can be ignored by a polluter, there will be too much pollution
relative to a Pareto optimum. Several policies can give polluters an economic incentive
to consider side effects when deciding how much pollution to generate.2 The three most
important economic incentives are taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits. These all work
by internalizing the externality , that is by making the polluter directly face the cost created
by the pollution.
Taxes. Since 1920 economists have recommended imposing a tax on polluting activity
equal to the incremental social cost imposed by that activity (A. C. Pigou, 1920). Then
as long as the social cost of the pollution is greater than cost of prevention or clean-up,
the polluter will want to reduce the pollution, to the point at which the social benefits of
further reductions are not sufficient to warrant the costs of obtaining the reductions. A
Pareto optimum can be achieved.
Subsidies. Rather than impose a tax to discourage pollution the government can offer
an equal subsidy per unit of reduction. A subsidy per pound of gunk reduced creates the
identical incentive as a tax per pound produced : each pound of gunk eliminated raises
profits by the amount of the subsidy or tax. The main difference between taxes and
subsidies is distributional: the cost of control can be paid by taxpayers (through a subsidy),
or by some combination of the factory’s owner, workers and customers (through a tax).
Tradable permits. A very different approach to using economic incentives for environ-
mental problems is to create a market in which the polluter must pay a price for the use
of the formerly unpriced input (e.g., clean air). The usual method is for the government
to issue permits for a fixed amount of gunk and to allow individuals and firms to buy and
2 When the noxious activity costs the victim more than it costs to prevent, the problem may be resolved
through negotiation and side payments. Although negotiation may work well for disputes between neigh-
bors, most environmental problems involve too many people for negotiations to be feasible. For instance,
one factory’s smoke may harm millions of residents over thousands of square miles. In general, correcting
environmental externalities will require some form of government intervention.
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sell the permits (Dales, 1968). The fewer the permits the higher will be their market price.
By controlling the quantity of permits the government can control the permit price so that
the polluter has to pay the same amount per pound of gunk as it would under a tax or
subsidy. Thus, all three methods can solve equivalently the problem of equating the costs
and benefits of externalities, while using the polluter’s self-interest to obtain the socially
desirable level of control.
One advantage of using these economic incentives is that a given level of pollution
control can be attained at the least cost. For example, with tradable permits, the permits
will be most valuable to polluters with the highest control costs; they will purchase the
permits, while those with lower control costs sell their permits and reduce their pollution.
This result contrasts with the use of emission standards: all polluters must to control to a
given level, even though it will likely be cheaper to have some polluters control a bit more
while others control an equal amount less.
As simple and effective as economic incentives seem for environmental remedies, there
are a number of complicating problems. For example, when there is uncertainty about the
benefits or costs of control, taxes and tradable permits are no longer equivalent. Which
method is more effective depends on the shapes of the incremental cost and benefit func-
tions (Weitzman, 1974).
Another problem is that the effectiveness of economic incentives depends on the com-
petitiveness of the markets in which polluters operate. Suppose a polluting firm is a
monopolist. Polluting monopolists impose two costs on society: the pollution generated,
and a reduction in production in order to raise price and profits. Imposing a pollution tax
on a monopolist reduces the pollution but simultaneously exacerbates the problem of too
little production. Thus a tax may actually make society worse off (Buchanan, 1969). More
generally, any time there are other market imperfections aside from the pollution external-
ity of concern, economic incentives are not guaranteed to raise social welfare. The incentive
policy may reduce pollution appropriately, but interact unfavorably with the other market
imperfections, causing some social loss to offset the gains from pollution control.
A third serious difficulty is that severe external harms can lead to problems for policy
design known as non-convexities, and corrective taxes are no longer guaranteed to achieve a
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Pareto optimum. Indeed, the usual incentives policies may make society worse off (Baumol
and Bradford, 1972). In particular, it is difficult to design effective economic incentives
policies when an environmental problem is likely to cause severe and irreversible damage.
Despite the problems with economic incentives policies, most economists view incentives
approaches to be more effective than alternatives. However, there has been substantial
recent attention to various practical implementation problems that throw further doubt
on the universal preferability of incentives policies. These problems include the possibility
that other, non-economic objectives are important (such as equity and administrative
simplicity), political contraints, high monitoring costs and other technological limitations
(Hahn and Stavins, 1992).
Research on the possibilities and limitations of economic incentives for environmental
remedies is an active area. Meanwhile, many recent policies have been based on economic
incentives. These include the use of tradable permits for leaded gasoline, chloroflourocar-
bons and SO2 emissions; deposit-refund systems for beverage containers and lead batteries;
and taxes on toxic solvent wastes and carbon dioxide.
For more thorough treatments of this material, see Schelling (1983) (nontechnical), Baumol
and Oates (1988), or Fisher (1981, ch. 6).
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